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I. INTRODUCTION
The First Circuit Court of Appeals' recent decision in Marie v. Allied
Home Mortgage Corp.,1 regarding the division of labor between the court
and the arbitrator has widened the circuit split in the interpretation of whether
a judge or arbitrator decides certain issues in light of the landmark Supreme
Court decision, Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,2 and the more recent
case, Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle.3 According to the First Circuit in
Marie v. Allied Home Mortgage Corp.,4 the issue of whether a party has
waived its right to arbitrate due to conduct in litigation is a question that
should be answered by courts, and not by arbitrators. 5 The First Circuit
reiterated the Supreme Court's distinction of duties between judges and
arbitrators borne of the Howsam and Green Tree decisions, holding that
procedural issues should be left to the arbitrator, and substantive issues
should be left to the court.6
Prior to Howsam, the traditional rule was that waiver of the right to
arbitrate by conduct due to litigation-related activity was an issue for the
court to decide. 7 The Howsam decision clarified that the court should decide
substantive issues such as whether the parties are bound by a given
arbitration clause, or whether a binding clause should be applied to a
particular type of controversy. 8 The language of the decision, however,
created confusion. The decision stated that many other types of claims,
including "gateway questions" that might dispose of the entire claim, should
be left to the arbitrator.9 The ensuing subject of interpretation among the
Circuit Courts is whether a party's waiver of the right to arbitrate,
specifically where other litigation-related conduct allegedly constitutes the
I Marie v. Allied Home Mortgage Corp., 402 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005).
2 Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
3 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
4 Marie, 402 F.3d at 1.
5 Id.; see also First Circuit Deepens Split Over Arbitration Waivers,
ADRWORLD.COM, Mar. 21, 2005, http://www.adrworld.com/ (subscription required) (last
visited Sept. 18, 2005).
6 Marie, 402 F.3d at 10.
7 Id. at 14.
8 Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84.
9 Id. at 84-85.
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waiver, is one of those gateway issues; the question that the courts will
grapple with interpreting post-Howsam is whether an issue is a substantive
question for the court, or a procedural issue for the arbitrator.
Though few courts have considered the impact of Howsam and Green
Tree on the doctrine of waiver of arbitration by conduct, there is
disagreement among the circuits who have interpreted the Supreme Court
decisions on the division of labor. The Eighth Circuit has held that the issue
of waiver in light of Howsam and Green Tree is presumptively an issue for
the arbitrator where the conduct allegedly constituting waiver is due to
litigation in some other court. 10 The court held that "the presumption is that
the arbitrator should decide 'allegations' of waiver, delay, or a like defense to
arbitrability.""'I In contrast, a panel for the Fifth Circuit has held that the
issue of waiver by conduct is for the court, and not for the arbitrator, where
the alleged waiver occurred due to conduct before the district court,
particularly due to the court's comparative expertise.12 In Marie, the First
Circuit held that "the Supreme Court in Howsam and Green Tree did not
intend to disturb the traditional rule that waiver by conduct, at least where
due to litigation-related activity, is presumptively an issue forthe court." 13
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Martha Marie began working for Texas-based Allied Home Mortgage
Corporation on November 1, 2000 as a mortgage loan officer. 14 Her live-in
boyfriend at the time, Joseph Thompson, was the branch manager of Allied's
Woburn branch; he hired her and acted as her supervisor. 15 Marie agreed to
the terms of compensation and employment, including an arbitration clause
in her employment contract that was signed by her and by Thompson acting
as Allied's representative. 16 The arbitration clause stated that both employer
and employee agreed to submit to final and binding arbitration for any and all
disputes, claims, and disagreements concerning both the terms of
employment and termination. 17 Further, the clause enumerated the procedure
10 Nat'l Am. Ins. Co. v. Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co., 328 F.3d 462, 466
(8th Cir. 2003).
11 Id. (quoting Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84 (citations omitted)).
12 Tristar Fin. Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Equicredit Corp. of Am., 97 Fed. Appx. 462, 464
(5th Cir. 2004).
13 Marie v. Allied Home Mortgage Corp., 402 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2005).
14 1d. at4.
15 Id.
16 Id
17 Id.
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for arbitration, stating that "[a]rbitration under this section must be initiated
within sixty days of the action, inaction, or occurrence about which the party
initiating the arbitration is complaining."' 18 The agreement also stated that
any arbitration was to be conducted under the rules of the American
Arbitration Association ("AAA").19
On April 23, 2003, nearly three years after her employment commenced,
Marie filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC and with the
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination ("MCAD") against
Allied and Thompson alleging sexual discrimination in violation Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") and applicable state law.20
Specifically, Marie claimed that during her tenure with Allied, Thompson
physically and verbally abused her because he thought she was having a
sexual affair with another employee and Thompson wanted her to have
sexual relations only with him.21
Allied filed a response to the charge on May 22, 2003. The EEOC issued
a Dismissal and Notice of Rights shortly thereafter on July 18, 2003, stating
that there was no finding of a Title VII violation, noting that Marie did not
utilize Allied's sexual harassment policy.22 But the dismissal stated that
Marie did have a right to sue Thompson or Allied for sexual discrimination
in federal or state court. 23
In October of 2003, Marie filed a civil complaint in Massachusetts
Superior Court, naming both Allied and Thompson as defendants. 24 In
November, an amended complaint was filed that named both Allied and
Thompson as defendants for assault and battery and sexual harassment under
Title VII, and named Allied for negligent supervision of Thompson, breach
of contract, and unjust enrichment. 25 Allied was served on November 20,
2003, and removed the action to federal district court in Massachusetts on
December 9, 2003.26
On December 22, Allied filed a demand for arbitration with the AAA,
which was within sixty days of being served. The following day, Allied
moved to compel arbitration and to stay the court proceedings.27 Marie
18 Id.
191d.
20Id. at 4-5.
21 Id. at 5.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
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opposed the motion, which was denied on January 8, 2004. The district
court's order stated that the initiation of arbitration proceedings occurred
more than sixty days, after the conclusion of the proceedings before the
EEOC, thereby falling outside of the parameters of the arbitration clause as
laid out in the adhesion employment contract.28 Allied, in turn, moved to
dismiss Marie's complaint as untimely, or, in the alternative, to reconsider
the denial of the motion to compel arbitration and to stay court
proceedings. 29 The district court denied the motion as to each alternative,
stating that the terms of the adhesion contract would be strictly construed
against the party that wrote it, and holding that Allied had waived its right to
arbitrate the. claims due to unreasonable delay, and thus the lawsuit would
proceed.30
Allied filed a notice of appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit as to the district court's order denying the motion for reconsideration
of the denial of Allied's motion to compel arbitration. 31
Ill. THE COURT'S HOLDING AND REASONING
The First Circuit held that the issue of waiver of the right to arbitrate due
to inconsistent activity in another litigation forum remains an issue for the
court, even in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's holdings in Howsam and
Green Tree.32 The court looked to Supreme Court and First Circuit precedent
to reason that the recent Supreme Court decisions considering the distinction
of powers did not disturb the traditional view that decisions of waiver in this
court-related context should be left to the court. 33
On the merits, the court held that an employer does not waive its right to
arbitration by failing to demand arbitration during the pendency of an EEOC
investigation, 34 based in part on the Supreme Court's decision in EEOC v.
Waffle House, Inc.,35 holding that an employer cannot preclude the EEOC
from bringing an enforcement action based on an employee's complaint by
relying on an arbitration clause between the employee and employer.36 After
2 8 Id.
2 9 Id.
30 Id. at 5-6.
31 Id. at 6.
32 Id. at 3. The court noted that the issue of compliance with a contractual time limit
should, in the first instance, be addressed by the arbitrator.
33 Id. at 3-4.
3 4 Id.
35 EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
36 Id.
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finding jurisdiction to review the district court's initial order denying
Allied's motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration, the court
reversed the decision of the district court, and remanded to the lower court
for a finding consistent with its decision.37
A. The First Circuit's Reliance on Precedent Regarding the Division
of Labor
The court noted that certain presumptions have been constructed to aid
in the division of labor between court and arbitrator, and that these
presumptions hold "in the absence of clear and unmistakable evidence to the
contrary."' 38 Furthermore, the court noted that any doubt concerning the
arbitrability of an issue should be resolved in favor of arbitration given the
pro-arbitration policy of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA").39
The court reviewed the Supreme Court's decision in Howsam, where the
Court held that the issue of whether an arbitration claim was barred by a six-
year limitations period, when it was enumerated in the arbitration rules and
agreed upon by the parties was an issue for the arbitrator, not the court.40 The
Howsam decision stated that two sorts of questions are presumptively for the
court to decide: (1) whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration
clause, and (2) whether a concededly binding arbitration clause applies to a
particular type of controversy. 41 The Howsam Court held that many other
types of claims are for the arbitrator to decide, including some "gateway
questions" that might dispose of the entire claim. 42 The First Circuit noted
that the framework that has developed post-Howsam reserves procedural
issues for the arbitrator, and substantive questions about the kind of disputes
intended for arbitration for the court.43
The court went on to review the Supreme Court's more recent decision
in Green Tree, which held that whether an arbitration agreement allowed for
class arbitration was an issue of contract interpretation for the arbitrator
rather than the judge.44 The Green Tree decision reaffirmed the framework
established in Howsam, holding that because the issue went to what kind of
37 Marie, 402 F.3d at 17.
38 Id. at 9 (quoting Green Tree, 539 U.S. at 452).
39 Id. (citing Moses H. Cone Mern'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24-25 (1983)).
40 Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 85-86 (2002).
41 Id. at 84.
42 Id. at 85-86.
43 Marie, 402 F.3d at 10.
44 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452-53 (2003).
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arbitration proceeding the parties had agreed to, rather than whether they
agreed to arbitrate, the issue was presumptively for the arbitrator to decide.45
The court noted that both Supreme Court decisions stressed the issue of
comparative expertise, and the presumption that parties intend to give their
disputes to the most able decisionmaker on a given issue.46
In reviewing the First Circuit's interpretation of these Supreme Court
decisions, the court looked to two recent decisions regarding the division of
labor. In Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc. v. UFCW, Union Local 791,47 the First
Circuit held that the question of whether multiple grievances being arbitrated
separately should be consolidated into a single arbitration was a procedural
matter that was presumptively for the arbitrator.48 In Richard C. Young &
Co. v. Leventhal,49 the court held that a forum-selection clause in an
arbitration clause was a procedural question left for the arbitrator to
determine. 50 Neither First Circuit decision addressed the waiver issue due to
litigation-related activities in light of Howsam because it was not raised by
any party until Marie.
1. Contractual Timeliness to be Decided by the Arbitrator
Relying on the above Supreme Court and First Circuit precedent, the
court held that in the present case, the contractual timeliness issue is for the
arbitrator, but that the issue of waiver by conduct is for the court.51 The court
held that the district court erred in interpreting the contractual time limit
clause and applying it to Allied, referring to the precedent set in Howsam that
this sort of procedural prerequisite is presumed to be for the arbitrator.52 The
court added that "[t]he arbitrator might be expected to have comparative
expertise in determining the meaning of these sorts of contractual limitations
provisions in light of the background norms in this employment area. 53
4 5 Id. at 452.
46 Marie, 402 F.3d at 11 (citing Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84-85; Green Tree, 539 U.S.
at 453).
47 Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc. v. UFCW, Union Local 791, 321 F.3d 251, 252 (1st
Cir. 2003).
4 8 Id. at 254.
49 Richard C. Young & Co. v. Leventhal, 389 F.3d 1, 1 (1st Cir. 2004).
50 Id. at 4-5.
51 Marie, 402 F.3d at 11.
52 Id. (citing Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84-85).
53 Marie, 402 F.3d at 11.
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2. Waiver to be Decided by the Court
The court restated the argument for waiver, stemming from the fact that
Allied participated in the EEOC proceedings initiated by Marie without
making the demand for arbitration during or after the proceedings, thereby
demonstrating conduct that is inconsistent with the desire to arbitrate its
claims. 54 The court noted that it has had a long history of deciding such
waiver claims, and that the court has previously held that the issue of waiver
due to litigation-related activity is presumptively for the judge and not the
arbitrator. 55 The court referred to the text of the FAA, noting that a court is
only permitted to stay a court action pending arbitration if "the applicant for
the stay is not in default in proceeding with such arbitration" 56 and a
"default" has generally been viewed by courts as including a waiver. 57 The
court concluded that the FAA language places a statutory command on courts
in cases where a stay is sought to decide the waiver issue themselves 58
In addition, the court referred to the Howsam Court's reliance on the
Revised Uniform Arbitration Act of 2000 ("RUAA"), which establishes that
procedural issues are generally for the arbitrator and substantive issues for
the court.59 The court noted that the same section of the RUAA that the
Howsam Court quoted treats waiver as an issue for the court: "Waiver is one
area where courts, rather than arbitrators, often make the decision as to the
enforceability of an arbitration clause."'60 The court went on to enumerate
various policy reasons why the court, and not an arbitrator, should decide
waiver issues where the waiver is due to litigation-related activity, including:
comparative expertise considerations such as a judge's ability to recognize
forum shopping; the fact that the inquiry implicates judicial procedures; and
the fact that the procedural waiver issue is not likely to be intertwined with
the merits of the dispute, which should be left to the arbitrator to determine
the outcome of the dispute. 61
Finally, the court noted that it would be exceptionally inefficient to send
a waiver claim to an arbitrator because if the arbitrator found that the
54 Id. (citing Menorah Ins. Co. v. INX Reinsurance Corp., 72 F.3d 218, 220-21 (1st
Cir. 1995)).
55 Marie, 402 F.3d at 12 (citing Menorah, 72 F.3d at 222; Jones Motor Co. v.
Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local Union No. 633, 671 F.2d 38, 43 (1st Cir. 1982)).
56 Marie, 402 F.3d at 12-13 (citing 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2000)).
57 Id. (citations omitted).
5 8 Id. at 13.
59 Revised Uniform Arbitration Act § 6, cmt. 2, 7 U.L.A. 14-15 (Supp. 2004).
60 Id. at 17.
61 Marie, 402 F.3d at 13 (citations omitted).
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defendant waived its right to arbitrate, the case would end'up back before the
district court, "bounc[ing] back and forth between tribunals without making
any progress." 62 The court concluded that the Supreme Court in Howsam and
Green Tree did not intend to upset the traditional rule that waiver by conduct,
at least where due to litigation-related activity, is presumptively an issue for
the court. 63
IV. CONCLUSION: THE IMPACT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT'S HOLDING
Due to the inconsistent nature of the language of Howsam and the
traditionally prevailing view that issues of waiver based on participating in
litigation were to be decided by the court, scholars have speculated that this
issue of division of labor may come before the Supreme Court. University of
Missouri-Columbia School of Law Professor Richard C. Reuben speculated
that because the line between the court's statutory authority to decide
questions under the FAA and the courts' procedural arbitrability doctrine is
not clear, the split will deepen as more appellate courts get the question, and
there will be a strong need for the U.S. Supreme Court to tackle the issue.64
Lori Turner
62 Id.
63 Id. at 14.
64 First Circuit Deepens Split Over Arbitration Waivers, supra note 6, at 1.
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